


# In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development

*From Douglass C North*  
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#1345290 in Books Douglass C North 2012-11-12 2012-11-02 Original language: English PDF # 1 8.98 x .83 x 5.98l, 1.10 #File Name: 1107684919378 pages In the Shadow of Violence Politics Economics and the Problems of Development | File size: 24.Mb

**From Douglass C North : In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development** before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development:

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Government-sponsored monopoly corruption nations By William

Garrison Jr. "In The Shadow of Violence", ed. by Douglass North, et. al., (Jan. 2013). This book is everything about "Limited Access Orders" (LAO). So what's an LAO? According to the authors, an LAO is a "way of organizing a society" whereby "developing societies limit violence through the manipulation of economic interests by the political system in order to create rents so that powerful groups and individuals find it in their interest to refrain from using violence" (p.3). Essentially, the authors spin the old adage "There is no honor amongst thieves" into "thieves may find it economically beneficial to engage in truces to avoid extinction." Sort of like when the La Cosa Nostra mobsters of the 1950s tried to carve up franchise territories that could be controlled by a particular crime 'family member' without having to fear violent competition from other 'frenemies'. These co-authors take this LAO 'developing' families concept beyond the familiar Al Capone and Mexican cartel 'protection racket' business models. They expand their LAO concept to include "monopolies." Unfortunately, they don't differentiate between 'natural' versus 'political' monopolies. Essentially, a 'natural' monopoly is one whereby an inventor develops a business/product that outshines (out sells) anything similar on the market, until someone else comes along and develops a better mousetrap. Whereas a 'political' monopoly is one whereby dictators or oligarchs are able to entice/bribe some government entity to give them a non-competitive monopoly control over some segment of the economy. Such as the lucrative monopolies that Filipino family members of Pres. Marcos were able to obtain from their patron. The authors should have really differentiated between these two types of monopolies. Besides studying the LAO structure of The Philippines, the authors discuss similar corrupt LAO monopolies in Bangladesh (and Pakistan), Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Mozambique, Zambia, and South Korea (of Pres. Park). Would I give this book to my mother (or any one's mom) to read? No - but maybe if I wanted her to fall asleep more speedily; I mean, it's a doozy dozer; not really captivating reading. For economists and policy wonks. Similar to, but much more statistical and detailed than "Why Nations Fail" by Daron Acemoglu. 0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. interesting extension of economic models to violence By Arnold I come from the political science discipline, so I'm sympathetic to the idea of using economic and political tools to study political phenomenon. In fact, I applaud the use of these analytical tools to the study of political violence. The idea of Limited Access Orders is brilliant. In short, the authors argue that some governments must expend so many resources just to manage and control society, and mitigate violence, that development is hindered. This framework is a challenge to the conventional view that development is hindered by greedy politicians or lack of resources. The authors are careful never to simply absolve local political elites, but do point out rational motive for some seemingly irrational policies. I'm generally not one to say that scholars need to take into account every development from every field on a subject. However, in this case it might have helped to take into account some of the more traditional accounts of kleptocracy in the case studies. For example, we saw the Marcoses not just reward and punish supporters, but also stole huge sums of money for personal use, including Imelda's notorious shoe collection. I'm presuming the authors don't think the shoe collection helped political stability. This book is an academic work by top political economists. However, as with many Cambridge academic tomes, it's also fairly readable. That said, it's not for the general audience. I'd recommend it only for students with at least a college level course in comparative politics. 0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Despite Academic Tone, Readable Material By A. May Shadow of Violence examines the varied ways coercion and politics and economics can mix, do mix, and have mixed in ways that prevent mutual destruction and make life a little peachier for a segment of society within the discussed countries -- or sometimes just a few people. Most Cambridge books tightly follow the thesis laid out, and this volume is no exception. Each chapter is a concise examination of the chosen government relative to the main idea. While I appreciate this in some books - particularly humanities-centric texts, I found that the leanings in this text almost felt like a primer versus a fully detached overview. However, one can easily combat these feelings by reading this book - and it is very sit down readable for an academic text - and then researching and forming your own ideas, something I know the intended audience for this book will have no problem doing.

This book applies the conceptual framework of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast's *Violence and Social Orders* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) to nine developing countries. The cases show how political control of economic privileges is used to limit violence and coordinate coalitions of powerful organizations. Rather than castigating politicians and elites as simply corrupt, the case studies illustrate why development is so difficult to achieve in societies where the role of economic organizations is manipulated to provide political balance and stability. The volume develops the idea of limited-access social order as a dynamic social system in which violence is constantly a threat, and political and economic outcomes result from the need to control violence rather than promoting economic growth or political rights.

'This book is a welcomed and outstanding companion to *Violence and Social Orders* by North, Wallis, and Weingast. The editors apply the earlier framework to numerous countries and draw lessons from which we gain considerable insights into modern development.' Lee J. Alston, University of Colorado 'The rigorous analyses of *In the Shadow of Violence* empirically demonstrate the explanatory power of the theory advanced by North, Wallis, and Weingast in *Violence and Social Orders*, corroborating their novel understanding of economic underdevelopment as a violence-

reducing equilibrium.' Benito Arruada, University Pompeu Fabra, Spain

*In the Shadow of Violence*, eight knowledgeable specialists address the politics and economics of eight key countries in the developing world. They explore as well what North, Wallis, and Weingast call the logic of 'limited access', wherein, it is held, political order comes at the expense of sustained economic growth. Using case materials, they evaluate this claim and teach us much about the political economy of development.' Robert Bates, Harvard University

The essays in this provocative volume, written by analytically attuned area experts, give flesh and bones to the theoretical perspective on 'limited access orders' developed in *Violence and Social Orders*. The studies show how the World Bank's attempts to transform countries into 'open access orders' typically yield more violence than development. The well-acclaimed editors offer an alternative approach to development policy - working within 'limited access orders' in order to improve people's livelihoods.' David D. Laitin, Stanford University

Through the insightful, well-documented case studies in this volume, we discover that control of violence is central to the experiences of the least and most successful developing countries of the last 50 years. The lesson from their experiences is as compelling as it is unpalatable: success - peace - may depend on allowing elites to retain large rents and supporting organizations that make it easier for elites to collude. This book is necessary reading for development professionals and political economy scholars alike.' Philip Keefer, The World Bank

North, Wallis, and Weingast come down to earth to apply their ideas to the details of poor countries' problems and institutions. Finally we are headed in the right direction. I hope Jim Kim buys everyone at the World Bank a copy; it won't leave my desk for years.' James Robinson, Harvard University

About the Author

Douglass C. North is co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science. He is Spencer T. Olin Professor in Arts and Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis and Bartlett Burnap Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Professor North received the John R. Commons Award in 1992. He is author of eleven books, including *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (1990), *Understanding the Process of Economic Change* (2005), and co-author, with John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, of *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

John Joseph Wallis is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He received his PhD from the University of Washington in 1981 and had a two-year postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Chicago. Professor Wallis is an economic historian who specializes in the public finance of American governments and more generally in the relation between the institutional co-development of governments and economics. His large-scale research on American state finance and institutions has been supported by the National Science Foundation.

Steven B. Webb worked at the World Bank for twenty-one years as an economist and advisor on policy research, evaluation and operations for Latin America and the Caribbean and other regions. He currently serves as a consultant to the Bank. Dr Webb's specializations include political economy, decentralization, public finance, central banks and monetary policy and economic history. His publications include *Public Sector Reform - What Works and Why* (2008), *Achievements and Challenges in Decentralization* (2000) and *Voting for Reform: The Politics of Adjustment in New Democracies* (1994, edited with Stephan Haggard).

Barry R. Weingast is the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He received his PhD from the California Institute of Technology in 1977. Professor Weingast spent ten years at Washington University in St. Louis in the Department of Economics and the School of Business. The recipient of the Riker Prize, the Heinz Eulau Prize and the James Barr Memorial Prize, he has also worked extensively with the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development. Professor Weingast co-authored *Analytical Narratives* (1998) and co-edited *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (2006).